The evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations has received much attention, but little is known about the effects of different modes of migration of individuals between groups. Here, we have incorporated four different modes of migration that differ in the degree of coordination among the individuals. For each mode of migration, we identify the set of multiplayer games in which the cooperative strategy has higher fixation probability than defection. The comparison shows that the set of games under which cooperation may evolve generally expands depending upon the degree of coordination among the migrating individuals. Weak altruism can evolve under all modes of individual migration, provided that the benefit to cost ratio is high enough. Strong altruism, however, evolves only if the mode of migration involves coordination of individual actions. Depending upon the migration frequency and degree of coordination among individuals, conditions that allow selection to work at the level of groups can be established.
Introduction
population size is kept constant. For such a process, the probability for a 74 single cooperator to take over the whole population, φ C , can be calculated 75 exactly, as well as the probability of a single defector taking over the whole 76 population, φ D (24; 64). These fixation probabilities form the basis of our 77 measure of success for each strategy.
78
In order to compare the evolutionary success of the two strategies C and .
(
The ratio of the fixation probabilities is given by (46) 
Whether this ratio is greater than 1 (i.e. cooperators are favoured) depends 87 solely on the sign of
migration probability. Due to λ 1, we consider the probability that a 121 group where the mutant has fixed will send out a migrant that will become 122 a member another group. This probability is equal to ne wan λ for groups of 
5 .
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The equation for the sign sum Λ 1 contains the sign sum of the single group 
Pair migration

142
Another mode of migration is one where migrants leave simultaneously.
143
For this mode we assume that every migration event carries propagules of a 144 finite number. For illustrative purposes, we discuss propagules of size 2 or
145
'pair migration'. In this case, we consider the probability that two deviating 146 individuals take over the population. The sign sum is
The additional term, now including the selection coefficient, may be positive 148 or negative, depending on the payoff comparison in groups with 1 and n − 1 
170
The probability that the number of migrants entering the same group is 171 equal to k is given by
The probability that at least one migrant is successful is equal to
Here φ Caravan C is the probability of a successful invasion of a group of defectors 174 by a cooperative group.
175
Similarly, the expected probability of the opposite event is
.
176
Thus, the ratio of fixation probabilities at the group level is
If p 1 − φ, the probability that the group invaded by the first migrant is The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not . http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/029470 doi: bioRxiv preprint first posted online Oct. 19, 2015;  means that the invaded group will be converted with a probability equal to 182 1. The ratio of fixation probabilities at the group level in this limit is
The sign sum (see Eq. (7)) for this mode is then
This is larger than in the migration mode for a single individual Λ 1 , as 185 Λ 0 < 0 for traits that are disadvantageous at the individual level (a i < b i ).
186
An increase in the number of groups in a population significantly increases 
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The difference in migration rates (λ C > λ D ) provides an advantage to co-205 operating groups, which emits proportionally more migrants in this mode.
206
This is reflected in an additional term ln 
Social dilemmas
219
To be more concrete, we now apply the results of the previous sections 
250
Strong altruism is always disadvantageous in populations without struc-251 ture, i.e. Λ 0 < 0. In addition, we find that and evenly shared amongst all players, including those that decided not to 271 make a donation. Weak and strong altruism can be naturally represented by 272 self-returning benefit and self-excluding benefit games, respectively (59; 14).
273
In self-returning benefit games, the public goods are shared among all par- 
284
We start with the simplest public goods game. Here, the reward to co- Table 1 . The LSE game is strongly altruistic, and can be viewed as a 292 multiplayer generalization of the standard prisoner's dilemma. 
300
In the simplest version of the game incorporating synergy and discount-301 ing, the first cooperator in the group pays a cost γ to generate β units of Payoffs and their differences for the linear self-returning (LSR), the linear self-excluding (LSE), the synergy/discounting self-returning (SDSR), and the synergy/discounting self-excluding (SDSE) public goods games. a i is the payoff to a cooperator in a group of size n with i cooperators, and b i is the payoff for a defector. The sum of the payoff difference a i − b i determines the value of Λ 0 (see Eq. 4). Switching from defection to cooperation leads to a payoff difference a i − b i−1 . Switching always decreases payoffs for the self-excluding benefit games (LSE and SDSE); however, the change in payoff for the self-returning benefit games (LSR and SDSR) can be positive and therefore cooperators could have a higher fixation rate than defectors in these games. (synergy/discounting game with self-excluding benefit, or SDSE game).
308
The payoffs a i and b i to players in these games (LSR, LSE, SDSR and 309 SDSE) and their differences are presented in Table 1 . For each of these games The evolution of cooperation does not always become easier with increasing benefit β. Cooperation is advantageous in terms of fixation probabilities if the sign sum Λ calculated for migration modes (lines) is positive (shaded region). In the well mixed case, Λ 0 decreases in self-excluding games and stays constant for selfreturning games. In the single individual migration mode and the differential migration mode, cooperation becomes easier with increasing benefit in the self-returning case, but harder in the self-excluding case. In the pair migration mode and in caravan migration, cooperation becomes easier with increasing benefit for all games with the current parameter set. (n = 24 for the well mixed population, m = 6 and n = 4 in migration models, ζ = 1.35, intensity of selection w = 0.1, cost of cooperation γ = 1, group migration bonus factor in differential migration mode w −1 ln(λ C /λ D ) = 5, colors as in Fig. 1 ). 
ratio is large enough. Clearly, increasing synergy in self-returning games 320 favours cooperation. In the caravan migration mode, the SDSE game, similar to the linear LSE 341 game, promotes cooperation if the benefit to cost ratio (β/γ) is high enough.
342
However, synergy of cooperators makes cooperation successful at lower values 343 
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367
Discussion
368
We have shown that migration, even in the absence of coordination be-369 tween individuals, promotes the evolution of weakly altruistic cooperation.
370
The single individual migration mode presented here is not based on pro-371 cesses that involve an entire group (65), or specific structure of groups (42).
372
Our results indicate that cooperation may emerge by means of group-level The fixation probability for one individual of the two strategies in a well 440 mixed population is equal to (46; 64)
e wb i e wa i (A.1) The ratio of these fixation probabilities is
Here, For group structure and small migration rates, the trait of interest first 446 needs to fix in a group (φ C ) and then that group needs to fix in the population
447
(Φ C ). The total fixation probability ratio is thus equal to Therefore the total fixation probability ratio is
Thus, the sign sum for the single individual migration mode is 
Here T i+ = ... and T i− = ... are probabilities to increase or decrease the 460 number of players with a chosen strategy if there are currently i players.
461
Because
Therefore, the ratio of individual-level fixation probabilities in the pair mi- 1 + e w(a n−1 −b n−1 ) = exp wΛ 0 + ln
The total ratio of fixation probabilities (taking into account that the invading 465 strategy starts with one player in the first group, and with two players in all 466 following migration invasions) is
w(a n−1 −b n−1 ) (A.10) and the sign sum is
In the caravan migration mode with large p, the probability of successful 470 invasion of one group into another is equal to 1. Therefore, the ratio of This way the total fixation probabilities ratio is
and the sign sum in the caravan migration mode is
In the differential migration mode, the groups have control over the mi-476 gration probabilities of the players. This affects the fixation probabilities at 477 the group level. The migration probabilities no longer cancel,
e wan e wb 0 e wΛ 0 +ln
(A.15) Therefore, the total fixation probability ratio is
and the sign sum becomes
The sign sum for the SDSE game in the pair migration mode is: show that this result holds true with any mapping.
492
In terms of fitness, strong altruism is characterized by two properties: 
499
The ratio of fixation probabilities in the structured population is given
. We calculate each term separately.
501
The ratio of fixation probabilities of a single cell in a group of opposite 502 composition (36; 46) is
(B.1)
22
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The ratio of fixation probabilities of a single group in a population of 
(B.3) Expression in parenthesis can be rewritten:
(B.4)
Thus, the fixation probabilities ratio is equal to
(B.5) So, the inability of the strong altruism to emerge in a single individual 510 migration mode holds true for all possible payoff to fitness mappings. 
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